Dynamic Common Pool Resources
PubblicoI present a dynamic common pool resource experiment where subjects have to make individual withdrawals in 20 rounds of decision-making. The subjects have a group account to withdraw from, that grows round by round depending on how much was left in the account in the previous round. I determine if subjects allow the resource to last through all the rounds. Also I examine what the differences are between the good and bad groups. I observed that some groups have the ability to make the resource last and also the good and bad groups have significant differences in their behaviors. I have found that there are differences in the frequency, persistence, and intensity of the different kinds of behavior that they exhibit.
- This report represents the work of one or more WPI undergraduate students submitted to the faculty as evidence of completion of a degree requirement. WPI routinely publishes these reports on its website without editorial or peer review.
- Creator
- Publisher
- Identifier
- E-project-050117-112201
- Advisor
- Year
- 2017
- Date created
- 2017-05-01
- Resource type
- Major
- Rights statement
- Ultima modifica
- 2021-02-03
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