On the Dynamics of Contributions and Beliefs in Repeated Public Good Games
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open in viewerUsing data from a repeated public good game, I conduct a Granger causality test and find that contributions and beliefs about the contributions of others decline together,with neither variable leading the other. As a result, I model contributions and beliefs using a system of simultaneous equations. Estimating the system provides evidence on the magnitude of the projection bias. Since contributions and beliefs move together, indicating that current and/or past values of one series are not useful for predicting future values of the other, I develop and test the hypothesis that contribution heterogeneity predicts changes in average contributions. I find support for my hypothesis using data from a variety of public good game experiments (with and without belief elicitation; fixed and random matching).
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- 2014-002
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- Date created
- 2/13/13
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- Extent
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- 最新修改
- 2020-09-21
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缩略图 | 标题 | 公开度 | Embargo Release Date | 行动 |
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On_the_Dynamics_of_Contributions_and_Beliefs_in_Repeated_Public_G.pdf | 公开 | 下载 |
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