The objective of this thesis is to conduct an in-depth analysis of the Rowhammer phenomenon. Rowhammer is a specific issue that results in the selective corruption of data within DRAM memories, triggered by specific memory access patterns. Notably, Rowhammer can manifest even with read-only memory accesses, potentially leading to data alterations within regions designated as read-only memory. This vulnerability poses a significant challenge to the integrity of various security mechanisms reliant on read-only permissions, such as user space-kernel space separation, process sandboxing, and the use of asymmetric cryptographic keys. Also crafting a practical Rowhammer attack often involves a deep understanding of the target system’s memory layout, which can be complex and hard to reverse engineer. Cloud service providers are apprehensive about the potential significant risk that Rowhammer presents to their server infrastructure. However, they currently lack a structured approach for assessing the vulnerability of the DRAM employed in their servers to Rowhammer attacks. This thesis introduces a comprehensive methodology designed to assess whether cloud servers are susceptible to these attacks, offering an end-to-end solution for this critical concern.

Creator

• Rahman, Kristi

Colaboradores

• Islam, Bashima, Dr.
• Sunar, Berk
• Mus, Koksal, Dr.

Degree

• MS

Unit

• Electrical & Computer Engineering

Publisher

• Worcester Polytechnic Institute

Identifier

• etd-115190

Palabra Clave

• TLS handshake
• Cryptographic Algorithm
• Rowhammer

Advisor

• Sunar, Berk

Committee

• Islam, Bashima, Dr.
• Mus, Koksal, Dr.

Defense date

• 2023-12-08

Year

• 2023

Date created

• 2023-12-14

Resource type

• Thesis

Source

• etd-115190

Rights statement

• In Copyright

Última modificación

• 2024-01-25