Current cryptographic algorithms pose high standards of security yet they are susceptible to side-channel analysis (SCA). When it comes to implementation, the hardness of cryptography dangles on the weak link of side-channel information leakage. The widely adopted AES encryption algorithm, and others, can be easily broken when they are implemented without any resistance to SCA. This work applies state of the art techniques, namely Secret Sharing and Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC), on AES-128 encryption as a countermeasure to those attacks. This embedded C implementation explores multiple time-memory trade-offs for the design of its fundamental components, SMC and field arithmetic, to meet a variety of execution and storage demands. The performance and leakage assessment of this implementation for an ARM based micro-controller demonstrate the capabilities of masking schemes and prove their feasibility on embedded software.

Creator

• Fernandez Rubio, Abraham

Contributeurs

• Eisenbarth, Thomas
• Huang, Xinming

Degree

• MS

Unit

• Electrical & Computer Engineering

Publisher

• Worcester Polytechnic Institute

Language

• English

Identifier

• etd-042717-122213

Mot-clé

• multiparty computation
• AES
• polynomial masking
• side-channel analysis

Advisor

• Eisenbarth, Thomas

Committee

• Huang, Xinming

Defense date

• 2017-04-21

Year

• 2017

Date created

• 2017-04-27

Resource type

• Thesis

Rights statement

• In Copyright